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NOTES
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE POST-IIRIRA: A
STRUGGLE BETWEEN EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATIONS PROMOTING
CLEMENCY MEASURES, AND STATUTORY
CONSIDERATIONS TENDING TOWARDS
OPPRESSION
NICOLE ABRUZZO*
INTRODUCTION
As Americans, we take pride in our nation's legal system,
which is generally believed to afford individuals a full and fair
opportunity for review. With regard to most situations, we are
probably correct in accepting this notion. Yet, should we still
consider our review truly full and fair if we knew some
Petitioners are effectively barred from conferring with their
attorneys? Now imagine that while awaiting review, a Petitioner
is sent by the court presiding over her case to a land alleged to
pose severe threats to her life and liberty, and although she is
ultimately granted a favorable decision, it is delivered too late, as
ST JOItN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
she has already been brutally murdered. In that scenario, was
the Petitioner given full and fair review? Regrettably, these
questions are not just hypothetical, but prevalent occurrences
within the realm of immigration, which have arisen in the wake
of a significant revision of the law.
In light of these problems, this article will define voluntary
departure and discuss how recent developments in immigration
law have affected its application. Subsequently, two personal
accounts will illustrate the immigrant's dilemma where the
circuit court has found itself incapable of tolling voluntary
departure periods. Thereafter, the majority of this note will
analyze the circuit split regarding whether or not to stay
voluntary departure, and the various arguments for and against
such equitable tolling. The penultimate section will explain that
even if the present voluntary departure statute is explicit, there
is a secondary, yet powerful, reason for amending the law. That
is, as the Attorney General charges aliens with removability and
then acts as their adversary in court, it is difficult to believe he
can distance himself from his predisposition against immigrants
when executing his statutorily assigned role to deliberate upon
whether to extend their time to voluntarily depart. Ultimately,
this article will show that voluntary departure law would be most
effective if Federal Circuit Court of Appeals judges were vested
with authority to stay voluntary departure, but only after having
determined it is highly probable the Petitioner will suffer
persecution if she voluntarily departs from the United States and
returns to her country.
I. BACKGROUND
Ten years ago, Congress enacted major changes in immigration
law when it passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA").' IIRIRA
*J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Philosophy,
Politics, and Law, and Italian Language and Literature, magna cum laude, State
University of New York at Binghamton, May 2003. The author wishes to thank Professor
Janice Villiers for sharing her time, guidance, extensive expertise, and insight into
Immigration Law in preparation of this Note.
1 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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drastically restructured immigration law. 2 Since then, circuit
courts have reinterpreted previously well-settled issues,3 often
arriving at diametrically opposed decisions where IIRIRA is less
than explicit.4 Particularly controversial among circuit courts,
and a prime example of such disparate conclusions resulting from
IIRIRA's vagueness, is whether pending judicial review they
have the jurisdictional authority to stay, that is, maintain the
status quo on, a voluntary departure period previously granted
by an Immigration Judge ("IJ") or the Board of Immigration
Appeals ("BIA").5 This contentious issue, which is discussed
below in much further detail, is exemplified by the First Circuit's
finding in Bocova v. Gonzales,6 that it maintained authority to
toll voluntary departure, versus the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Ngarurih v. Ascroft,7 that it lacked that precise power.
2 See Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 479-80 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating previously
Petitioners were entitled to automatic stays of removal, and finding under IIRIRA, stays
are no longer automatic, but discretionary); see also Stanley Mailman, Cutting Back on
Hearings, Judicial Review, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 28, 1996, at 3 (referring to IIRIRA as "major
overhaul" of immigration law, and delineating some significant changes, for example,
creation of removal proceedings to adjudicate both admissibility and deportability, which
under the old law were two distinct types of hearings).
3 See, e.g., Andreiu, 253 F.3d at 478 (explaining, "[tihis case requires us to consider
the application of certain 1996 amendments to the nation's immigration laws to an alien's
motion for stay of removal proceedings pending the resolution of a petition for review.");
Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing IIRIRA changes old rule for
staying voluntary departure).
4 See Chen v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 110, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting circuit split
caused by IIRIRA's language regarding availability of asylum to individuals whose
girlfriends have been compelled by the government to undergo abortion); see also Ly v.
Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging circuit split regarding
constitutionality of indefinite detention under Section 236 of IIRIRA).
5 See Chelsea Walsh, Voluntary Departure: Stopping the Clock for Judicial Review, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2857, 2870 (2005) (noting while most courts hold they lack authority to
reinstate voluntary departure, conversely, majority found they have jurisdiction to stay
departure periods due to their equitable powers); see Gary Young, May Judges Stay
Voluntary Departure?, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at 19 (delineating how circuits are
split).
6 412 F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating, "[wie do not find any language in the
IIRIRA itself that limits our authority to suspend the running of an unexpired voluntary
departure period.").
7 371 F.3d 182, 193 (4th Cir. June 10, 2004) (finding neither Immigration and
Nationality Act nor regulations grant circuit courts of appeals jurisdiction to stay orders
of voluntary departure).
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A. The Ins and Outs of Voluntary Departure:
Voluntary departure is a form of discretionary relief that IJs
and the BIA may grant removable aliens. 8 This relief permits
aliens to leave on their own volition within a designated period,
and without suffering the stigma and/or consequences of being
forcefully removed, such as ten-year banishment from the United
States. 9 Moreover, since voluntary departure also relieves the
government of expenses it would have otherwise incurred from a
compelled removal, and expedites the removal process, it seems
to benefit all parties involved.10 In order for an alien to be eligible
for this type of relief she must establish: she has demonstrated
good moral character for the past five years; 11 she has been in
the United States continuously for at least one year prior to
receiving notice of her removability;12 she is not deportable as an
aggravated felon pursuant to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f) (2005) (denying courts "jurisdiction over an appeal from
denial of a request for an order of voluntary departure"); see also Walsh, supra note 5, at
2863 (explaining how IJs conduct hearings on matters brought by aliens regarding
departure and BIA serves as the appellate body).
9 See Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 651 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing benefits
and detriments of voluntary departure from alien's perspective); see also Young, supra
note 5 (offering reasons for which aliens may choose to depart voluntarily).
10 Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 651 (citing Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 614 (8th Cir.
2004)) (explaining how for the government voluntary departure "expedites and reduces
the cost of removal"); see Walsh, supra note 5, at 2868 (explaining federal government's
incentives for permitting and complying with voluntary departure orders).
11 Compare Dows v. Gonzales, No. 03-2068, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15730, at *3 (3d
Cir. 2005 May 5, 2005) (explaining where Petitioner's testimony was not credible for
failure to rise to level of intentional false testimony, finding good moral character was not
precluded), and Charles Wheeler, The Immigration Consequences of Using a False Social
Security Number, 8 BENDER'S IMMIG. BULL. 952 (2003) (reiterating Ninth Circuit's ruling
in Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000) that criminal convictions for using
false social security number does not preclude good moral character), and Administrative
Decisions BIA Decisions, 5 BENDER'S IMMIG. BULL. 25 (2000) (explaining there may be
good moral character where Petitioner had supplied false birth certificate, but had no
other legal problems, and was close and supportive of his family), with Joseph Justin
Rollin, Humpty Dumpty Logic: Arguing Against the 'Aggravated Misdemeanor" in
Immigration Law, 6 BENDER'S IMMIG. BULL 445 (2001) (stating those who have been
convicted of aggravated felonies cannot establish good moral character), and
Administrative Decisions BIA Decisions, 5 BENDER'S IMMIG. BULL. 25 (2000) (explaining
habitual drunkenness may preclude finding good moral character).
12 See generally Paige L. Taylor, Immigration Law: Still Constrained By The "Culture
Of No", 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 857, 868 (2005) (discussing interruptions of continuous
presence); Samuel A. Yee, Final Exit Or Administrative Exhaustion? The Deported Alien's
Catch-22, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 605, 614 n.56 (1994) (noting requirement of continuous
presence in United States).
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(1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) 13 or Section 237(a)(4) (1227(a)(4))14; and
finally, she must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence,
that she has the means to depart from the United States and
intends to do so. 15
While voluntary departure is a well-settled alternative to
removal at the IJ and BIA level, whether it is still an option at
the circuit court level is questionable, and depends on the circuit
in which the Petitioner's case is heard.16 This is primarily due to
a struggle between equitable and statutory considerations. 17
B. Dilemma: To Voluntarily Depart or Not to Voluntarily Depart?
That is the Question.
In the abstract, it seems that voluntary departure is a merciful
alternative to deportation. 18 However, if an alien appeals the
denial of her claim, this relief appears increasingly less generous,
especially where the reviewing court lacks jurisdiction to stay the
departure period. Those circumstances, presuming that
complying with voluntary departure is a clear and effortless
decision, fail to consider what the alien might be abandoning
when required to leave the United States. It also ignores what
the alien may be returning to in her country of origin.
13 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (describing an offense under this section as an
aggravated felony rendering any alien convicted of such a crime at any time after
admission deportable).
14 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2006) (defining serious crimes such as terrorism, espionage,
and sabotage as grounds for deportation).
15 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(D) (2006) (requiring that "alien has established by clear and
convincing evidence that the alien has the means to depart the United States"); see
Baluyot v. Gonzales, No. 04-15655, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23981, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 20,
2005) (requiring passport to establish intent and means to depart fell within scope of 8
U.S.C. Section 1229c(b)(1)(D)).
16 See Walsh, supra note 5, at 2870 (summarizing most circuits' holdings that they
lack authority to reinstate departure, but have jurisdiction to stay departure periods
pending judicial review); see also Young, supra note 5, at 19 (categorizing circuits
according to whether they stay and/or reinstate voluntary departure).
17 See Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 651 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing
possibly disastrous ramifications of sending petitioners back to their countries while
awaiting decisions on their appeals); see also Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275,
280 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining government's 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(0 argument).
18 See Taylor, supra note 12, at 868 (proffering voluntary departure is clement
regardless of when granted); see also Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft; 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals; Immigration Law, TEXAS LAWYER, Nov. 10, 2003, at 500 (quoting "voluntary
departure is granted an alien as a form of clemency.., in return for his agreeing to
relinquish his illegal presence.").
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One readily imaginable and heartbreaking scenario is that an
alien might be forced to leave her children behind.'9 This
situation is distressing enough when speaking hypothetically or
acknowledging it as an occasional occurrence. Alarmingly,
however, reports indicate that tens of thousands of children were
left behind in 2003 by the 887,000 aliens compelled to voluntarily
depart that year.20 As a paradigm for this crisis, one particular
article recounts the story of the ironically, named Feliz family.21
Their saga began when Berly, the mother, on an otherwise
routine trip to renew her work-authorization at the immigration
office, was handcuffed and promptly expelled from the country
due to a resurfaced deportation order. 22 Fortunately, Virginia,
Berly's American born daughter, who was only six when her
mother was deported, was not left behind alone, but with her
United States citizen father, Carlos Feliz. 23 Thus, unlike some
other children whose parents where ordered removed or granted
voluntary departure, Virginia was not effectively orphaned. 24
Nevertheless, it is painfully obvious from Virginia's statement
that, "it's not fair that everybody else has their mom except me,"
and her diagnosis of major depression, that being separated from
19 See Nina Bernstein, A Mother Deported, and a Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 2004, at Al (discussing immigration law's disastrous effect on family ties); see also
Impact of Illegal Immigration, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56-57 (2005)
(testimony of Rep. Gutierrez) (suggesting government should act on illegal immigration
because current laws cause egregious results such as children's separation from their
parents).
20 Bernstein, supra note 19, at Al (basing figures on immigration experts'
contentions); see also Migration Information Source and Independent Task Force on
Immigration and America's Future Briefing Sept. 6 in Washington, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept.
1, 2005 (stating "voluntary departure accounted for four of every five removals in FY
2003 ... ").
21 Bernstein, supra note 19, at Al (translating Spanish word "feliz" into English word
"happy").
22 Id. (explaining immigration services did not afford Berly Feliz any time to make
arrangements for her family due to rapid and unexpected deportation); see Suzanne
Travers, Deported Teen Misses U.S., Manchester Student, Denied Asylum, Was to
Graduate, THE RECORD, June 21, 2004, at A03 (recounting story of Elias Attie, a Lebanese
teenager, who upon reporting to immigration for registration pursuant to an anti-
terrorism program, was detained, deported, and deprived graduation from high school).
23 See Bernstein, supra note 19, at Al (discussing Mr. Feliz' struggle to support
Virginia since Berly's deportation).
24 Id. (describing Virginia's life with her unemployed, disabled father); see also Caitlin
Kelly, Heartbreak Hotel. Queens House is Home to Children in Country Illegally, DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 4, 2005, at 22 (stating immigrant children live in "heartbreak hotel" for
various reasons, one of which being that their parents were deported).
[Vol. 21:3
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her mother has severely disrupted her life.25 Equally distraught,
a tearful Berly Feliz described her turmoil over missing her
daughter: "I don't eat. I don't sleep. I can't be without her. I have
no life."26 In spite of having retained an attorney to challenge her
deportation, Mrs. Feliz and her family, like many others, can
only suffer while waiting for a hopefully favorable decision on her
appeal. 27
Even more disconcerting than what an alien may be leaving
behind in the United States is what she may be returning to,
particularly if she is an asylum-seeker. In essence, if an asylum-
seeker wishes to appeal the denial of her claim to the circuit
court that lacks authority to stay voluntary departure, she will
be forced to choose between two equally oppressive options. 28
Twenty-six-year-old Filipino nurse Shirley Manas, who came to
America when she was twelve after witnessing the communists
ambush her mother with sixteen bullets, exemplifies the first
option.29 Like Ms. Manas, an asylum-seeker could comply with
her order of voluntary departure in hope that the circuit will
grant her asylum, allowing her one day, to finally enter the
United States lawfully.30  Fortunately for Ms. Manas, the
Philippines she returned to while waiting for the Third Circuit's
25 See Bernstein, supra note 19, at Al (expressing Virginia Feliz's intense sadness,
frustration, and resentment caused by her mother's absence).
26 Id. (explaining parental guilt resulting from having to leave the United States
without one's child).
27 See id. (explaining governmental delays in processing Mrs. Feliz's claim, and
quoting her attorney, Jeffrey A. Feinbloom as commenting, "[tihe interest of the
government in removing this woman pales in comparison with her suffering and her
family's. And this child is a citizen, this husband is a citizen. What about their rights?').
28 See Walsh, supra note 5, at 2858 (proposing aliens seeking asylum will have to
choose between having their appeals heard or enjoying the benefits of voluntary
departure if their appeal filed is in a circuit that does not reinstate or stay such relief); see
also Young, supra note 5, at 19 (addressing voluntary departure dilemma that aliens
denied asylum, but granted voluntary departure, may not be able to appeal because of the
impracticability of doing so while overseas).
29 See generally Elizabeth Llorrente, Green Card Blues; Nurse, 26 Facing Deportation
to Philippines, THE RECORD, Apr. 27, 1997, at L01 (discussing Manas's traumatizing
experience as a young girl in the Philippines).
30 Id. (explaining harsh choice Manas was compelled to make); see Scott Baldauf,
Elian's Peers Treated Differently, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 18, 2000, at USA 1
(raising awareness about South American children who illegally enter the United States
alone, commenting that while some when discovered by immigration officials elect to
voluntarily depart so as to avoid denial of legal entry in the future, others apply for
asylum "on the grounds that forcible return will lead to a life on the streets, at the mercy
of roving gangs, and renegade police officers.").
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decision on appeal, was no longer the violent place it had been
when her mother was murdered. 31
Another asylum-seeker, however, may not be as lucky as Ms.
Manas. Consequently, to reap the potential benefit of re-entering
the United States lawfully, the unlucky asylum-seeker is
compelled to return to her still quite dangerous country. In doing
so, the unlucky asylum-seeker risks such grave irreversible perils
as female genital mutilation, torture, and/or assassination, which
may be the very persecution she sought to avoid by applying for
asylum.32 Even if an asylum-seeker is fortunate enough to elude
her persecutors, perhaps by designating a departure destination
other than her own country, her right to review may still be
thwarted due to difficulties in carrying out litigation from
abroad.33 In light of these problems, in the alternative, the
asylum-seeker may decide to contravene her voluntary departure
order, fearing what may happen to her upon return to her native
land.34 However, while waiting for the circuit court's ruling, her
voluntary departure period will run, rendering her removable,
and accountable for various penalties associated with
transgressing the order, such as fines up to $5,000, and a up to a
ten-year ban on further relief. 35
31 See Lorrente, supra note 29, at LO (explaining unlikelihood that Shirley Manas
would be granted political asylum since conditions had vastly improved); see generally
Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that political asylum is
not granted when conditions at asylants home country have improved).
32 See Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 304, 310 (7th Cir. 2002) (staying voluntary
departure pending review where Petitioner's four year old daughter would be forced to
undergo female genital mutilation if she returned to Nigeria); see also Andreiu, 253 F.3d
at 478-79 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing Petitioner's alleged vulnerability to communist
attempted murderers if forced to return to Romania on account of his National Liberal
Party activism).
33 See Walsh, supra note 5, at 2881 (commenting that "while aliens in these
situations may formally retain their right to appeal under the post-IIRIRA statute after
leaving this country, their purpose in seeking an appeal is arguably thwarted.") (footnote
omitted); see also Young, supra note 5, at 19 (asserting that "aliens who are in the midst
of appealing.., a denial of asylum-may have to drop those appeals if they accept
voluntary departure, because of the practical difficulties of carrying on litigation from
abroad.").
34 See Khalil v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 176, 180-81 (1st Cir. 2004) (arguing that absent
ability to reinstate voluntary departure aliens will be forced to choose between judicial
review and departing within the allotted period); see also Walsh, supra note 5, at 2881
(summarizing circuits' rationale for staying and reinstating voluntary departure asylum-
seekers who are forced to return to countries where they are unsafe).
35 See Honorable John F. Gossart, Jr., Lady Liberty Blows out her Torch: New
Immigration Law is Unforgiving and Far More Restrictive, 27 U. BALT. L.F. 25, 28 (1997)
(warning about failure to depart within designated period); see also Michael D. Patrick,
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Clearly, the Feliz's story exemplifies the emotional struggle
immigrant families may endure where their circuit court failed to
stay a family member's voluntary departure period. Similarly,
Shirley Manas's narrative typifies the dilemma the asylum-
seeker who appeals her claim faces when her time to voluntarily
depart cannot be suspended. But, further still, these accounts
illustrate the urgent need for reformation of the actual statutory
language defining and relating to voluntary departure, and/or
the manner in which the law is interpreted and applied. Altering
the law to prevent families, like the Felizes, from being torn
apart, and innocent people, such as Ms. Manas, from being
returned to countries where they were previously persecuted or
are likely to suffer future persecution, would render voluntary
departure merciful, as it was intended to be, rather than cruel
and oppressive, as it has become since IIRIRA.
However, perhaps it is hasty to call voluntary departure cruel
and oppressive just because it has some negative effects such as
familial separation and the asylum-seeker's dilemma. It is
possible that there is a rational justification for these adverse
effects of voluntary departure. For example, there might be a
legitimate concern that illegal aliens will extend their stay in the
United States indefinitely by continuously filing appeals from
denials of their claims. Alternatively, these seemingly severe
predicaments caused by voluntary departure may have feasible
solutions. These questions are best answered by analyzing the
circuit split.
Significant Changes Take Place in April, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at 3 (discussing
IRIRA's effect on voluntary departure). See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(3), (b)(3), (d)
(2005) (providing that aliens who fail to leave within allotted departure period face
forfeiture of required bond, fines up to $ 5,000, and ten-year period of ineligibility for
certain forms of relief).
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II. ONE VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE LAW-TwO EXTREMELY
DIVERGENT OPINIONS:
A. The Circuit Split:
A majority of circuits addressing whether they have authority
to stay voluntary departure have determined they do.36 These
are the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals.37 Their principal argument is that
IIRIRA has not foreclosed circuit courts' equitable powers.38
Conversely, the minority, which has only has been steadfastly
represented by the Fourth Circuit, though quite convincingly,
argues that the plain text of IIRIRA expressly precludes circuit
courts from suspending voluntary departure. 3 9
B. Up in Interpretive Arms:
i. Equity is Victorious:
Recently, in Bocova v. Gonzales,40 an Albanian national,
Artur Bocova appealed from the denial of his claims for asylum
and withholding of removal. 41 Although the BIA granted Bocova
voluntary departure, by the time the First Circuit reviewed his
case, his period to leave the United States without repercussions
had expired.42 Consequently, not only did the court have to
36 See Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 266 (1st Cir. 2005) (retaining the power to
toll voluntary departure); see also Walsh, supra note 5, at 2885 (clarifying reason for
which most circuits find they may grant stays).
37 See Thapa v. Gonzales, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21046, at *14 (2d Cir. Aug. 16,
2006); see also Young, supra note 5, at 19.
38 See Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (announcing that
court retains equitable powers to toll voluntary departure); see also Walsh, supra note 5,
at 2870 (highlighting rationale for tolling periods at circuit level).
39 See Ngarurih v. Ascroft, 371 F.3d 182, 193 (4th Cir. June 10, 2004) (finding it lacks
any statutory or regulatory power to stay voluntary departure periods); see also Thapa,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21046, at *14 (stating Fourth Circuit rejects argument that circuit
courts of appeals have authority to suspend voluntary departure).
40 412 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 2005).
41 See id. at 260-61 (positing procedural history); see generally Posting of S. Cotus to
Appellate Law & Practice to
http://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/2005/06/calsuspending_.html (June 24, 2005,
16:39 EST) (affirming on appeal suspension of voluntary departure).
42 See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 260 (finding that issues of staying, reinstating, and
fashioning new voluntary departure periods were raised); see also Posting of S. Cotus,
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examine the merits of Bocova's asylum claim, but also, how
IIRIRA affected its own powers and procedures concerning
voluntary departure. 43 In particular, the court analyzed whether
it had authority to suspend the running of an unexpired period,
which was an issue of first impression.44
Bocova's asylum application was predicated on his claim that
he was subjected to persecution on account of his political
affiliations with, and avid support of the Albanian Democratic
Party ("ADP").45 Similar to many other ADP members, Bocova
alleged that because of his participation in political rallies, he
was once arrested, detained without charges, beaten, and
threatened that if he would not sever ties with the ADP he would
be killed.46 As if Bocova had not suffered enough from that first
encounter, his second run was even more egregious because the
police, apparently remembering him as an ADP sympathizer
from the prior rally, considered him a recidivist.47 Thus, the
police thought Bocova's political opinion might be changed if they
beat him with metal chains until he required hospitalization. 48
Nevertheless, Bocova, always steadfast in his views, "continued
to participate overtly in the ADP," and hired a lawyer to bring
suit against the police.4 9 However, upon his lawyer's warning
supra note 41 (noting that defendant did not show that "he was entitled to such a
suspension because 'the alien must make a timeous motion, that is, he must so move
before the voluntary departure period expires."').
43 See Bocova v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 257, 260 (1st Cir. 2005) (synergizing court's
holding on various questions presented); see also Posting of S. Cotus, supra note 41
(stating that Congress did not strip court of jurisdiction).
44 See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 260 (defining relevant issues); see also Posting of S. Cotus,
supra note 41 (proposing that court lacked authority to fashion or reinstate voluntary
departure periods "as a matter of first impression").
45 See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 261 (describing Bocova's involvement with ADP); see
generally David Ashenfelter, Albanians See Hope for Asylum, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July
25, 2005 (noting how police repeatedly detained, beat and threatened members of ADP).
46 Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 261 (1st Cir. 2005) (defining violence and threats
against Bocova); see David Ashenfelter, Albanians See Hope for Asylum, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, July 25, 2005 (recounting the many persecutions of Mimi Mece, who was
repeatedly beaten and whose life was threatened because he was politically active in
ADP).
47 Bocova, 412 F.3d at 261 (explaining why second encounter with police was worse).
48 Id. (noting the police remarked that Bocova had not learned his lesson and beat
him with chains attached to plastic pipes).
49 Id. (explaining Bocova remained in Albania, participated in ADP activities and
consulted a lawyer about filing charges).
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that an action against the police would only lead to Bocova
becoming even more of a target, Bocova fled from Albania.50
Surprisingly, despite finding Bocova's version of the facts was
credible, the IJ denied his claim because the two incidents, over
an eight-year span, were insufficient to suggest that Bocova was
systematically targeted for abuse on account of his political
beliefs. 51 However, the IJ did grant Bocova a voluntary departure
period of sixty-days. 52 On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ's
decision and permitted him an additional thirty-days within
which to leave the United States voluntarily, which subsequently
was extended due to a re-issuing of the decision.5 3 Afterwards, on
the day before his voluntary departure period was to expire,
Bocova filed a petition for review with the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, which was affirmed in an analysis highly deferential to
the BIA.54
Having decided the asylum question, the court proceeded to
examine the voluntary departure issues.55 Since Bocova moved to
stay the running of his expired voluntary departure period
pending appeal, the court issued a provisional stay until it had
concluded upon its own authority on the matter. 56 To aid in its
decision, the First Circuit directed the parties to address in their
appellate briefs whether courts of appeals possess the authority
to fashion, reinstate, or stay periods of voluntary departure, and
if so, under what conditions. 57 In addition to the parties' briefs,
the court also had the assistance of the American Immigration
50 Id. (stating Bocova ultimately fled from Albania).
51 Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262-63 (ist Cir. 2005) (providing reason for
denial of Bocova's asylum application despite his credibility).
52 Id. at 261 (providing procedural history of Bocova's claim).
53 Id. (describing BIA's affirmance of IJ's decision and how Bocova's voluntary
departure period was extended because of "technical snafu.").
54 Id. at 261-63 (explaining while asylum-seekers must show either past persecution,
or a well-founded fear of future persecution, "persecution is a protean word," and circuit is
bound by BIA's interpretation unless it is an "unreasonable reading of the statute or
inexplicably departs from the BIA's earlier pronouncements."); see Palma-Mazariegos v.
Gonzales, 428 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Bocova in that persecution requires more
than "episodic violence or sporadic abuse," it must be systematic).
55 Bocova, 412 F.3d at 264 (delving into third section entitled "III. Voluntary
Departure").
56 Id. at 262 (stating Bocova moved to stay his voluntary departure time two months
after it had expired).
57 Id. (asking parties write briefs regarding validity of voluntary departure issues at
the circuit court of appeals level).
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Law Foundation, which filed an amicus brief on the issues in
contention. 58
Preliminarily, noting that fashioning a new period for
voluntary departure and reinstatement are functionally
equivalent, the court dealt with their validity simultaneously. 59
Asserting that all courts of appeals having reviewed these "issues
thus far have concluded that they no longer may reinstate
expired periods of voluntary departure," the court found the
matter "open and shut."60 Thus, the court concluded it could no
longer reinstate or fashion new periods of voluntary departure.61
Finally, the court turned to Bocova's argument that circuit
courts of appeals may stay previously granted voluntary
departure periods pending review. 62 Acknowledging that most
circuits have determined they retain authority to stay voluntary
departure, the First Circuit readily subscribed to this view.63 The
court explained that the Hobbs Act provides for courts' equitable
powers to "restrain or suspend" an order's operation prior to
making a final determination. 64 Thus, asserting the sixty-day
maximum period the BIA may grant is simply insufficient for
"docketing, briefing, argument, and decision of a petition for
judicial review," the court justified suspending voluntary
departure until the conclusion of a case.65 While the court was
equivocal, presumably the need for sufficient time to appeal
warranted tolling the voluntary departure period because the
58 Id. (stating court ultimately had three briefs on relevant issues).
59 Id. at 266 (explaining, "[r]einstating an expired voluntary departure period is
functionally equivalent to fashioning a new voluntary departure period; doing so would
require the court to dictate both the length of the period and the time when it would begin
to run...").
60 Id. (asserting no circuit court having addressed reinstatement has found it had
authority to do so).
61 Id. (disclaiming existence of authority to reinstate voluntary departure, and thus
abrogating previous decision finding otherwise).
62 Id. (addressing Bocova's request for a stay).
63 Id. (stating four circuits have concluded they may stop the clock on voluntary
departure granted by BIA).
64 Id. at 266-67 (explaining 8 U.S.C. Section 1252 renders final orders of removal
subject to the Hobbs Act); see 28 U.S.C. § 2349(b) (2005) (stating filing petition for review
alone does not stay or suspend operation of order, but court of appeals has discretion to
restrain or suspend, in whole or in part, operation of order pending the final hearing and
determination of petition).
65 See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 269 (justifying its use of equitable powers); see also Young,
supra note 5 (commenting aliens may have to abandon appeals if they wish to accept
voluntary departure).
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alien would otherwise have to choose between full and fair review
and avoiding removability.
Having found it could stay voluntary departure, the court's
final inquiry dealt with what its procedure would be for doing
so. 66 First, the court decided that an alien requesting a stay of
voluntary departure must file a motion explicitly requesting this
form of relief prior to the expiration of the period. 67 Rejecting
persuasive authority, the court found it unnecessary for the alien
to first exhaust administrative remedies, as it asserted no such
remedies actually existed. 68 Next, addressing its own procedure
for evaluating whether a particular asylum-seeker's voluntary
departure ought to be stayed, the court articulated the following
four-part test: (1) that the asylum seeker must be likely to
succeed on the merits of his case; (2) that without the stay, he
will suffer irreparable harm; (3) that any potential harm derived
by staying the voluntary departure is outweighed by the harm to
the alien; and (4) granting a stay is not against public interest. 69
Unfortunately for Bocova, because he moved to stay voluntary
departure once it had already expired, the court denied his
motion.70
ii. Strict Construction Prevails:
By contrast, in Ngarurih v. Ascroft,71 the Fourth Circuit
considered the same questions as in Bocova, but arrived at the
opposite conclusion. 72 However, because the arguments against
affording the Circuit Courts of Appeals authority to suspend
66 Id. at 268 (articulating disagreement regarding procedure for a Petitioner to move
for a stay of voluntary departure).
67 Id. (declaring motion requesting a stay of removal would be insufficient to qualify
also as a motion for a stay of voluntary departure).
68 Id. at 269 (explaining its reason for rejecting the seventh circuits requirement that
aliens seeking stays of voluntary departure exhaust all administrative remedies prior to
requesting such relief from presiding court).
69 Id. at 270 (adopting criteria delineated for assessing stays of removal and applying
it to stays of voluntary departure); accord Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d. 703, 706 (7th Cir.
1999) (articulating standard for reviewing motion to stay voluntary departure).
70 Bocova, 412 F.3d at 270 (denying Bocova's motion for stay of voluntary departure,
but explaining because his stay of removal had been granted earlier, he still had an
interval in which he could depart without consequence).
71 371 F.3d 182, 193 (4th Cir. June 10, 2004).
72 Id. at *15-*17 (adhering to Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275 where third
circuit decided it could not reinstate voluntary departure and explaining extending
voluntary departure also usurps Attorney General's power).
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voluntary departure were best articulated by the Third Circuit in
Hadi v. Attorney General of the United States,73 that decision
shall be discussed herein. Yet, it is important to keep in mind
that Hadi's holding was recently disregarded by the Third
Circuit in Obale v. Atty Gen'l,7 4 which found that the Circuit
Courts of Appeals may, in fact, stay voluntary departure.75
In that case, Susi Nursanti Hadi, an Indonesian citizen
allegedly suffered multiple assaults and repeated vandalism on
and thievery from her family's store. 76 She claimed she was
targeted on account of her Chinese ethnicity and Christian
religion, and that despite attempts to seek help, the police were
unresponsive. 77 Finding Hadi's testimony incredible, the IJ
denied Hadi's claims of asylum, withholding of removal, and
Article Three of the United Nations Convention against Torture
("CAT") relief.78  However, the IJ granted Hadi voluntary
departure.79 Subsequently, upon affirming the denial of asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief without opinion, the BIA
extended her time to depart by thirty-days.80
On appeal, the Third Circuit first reviewed and denied Hadi's
asylum claim.S1 The court reasoned that although Hadi had been
a victim of criminal conduct which was motivated by her
ethnicity and religion, none of the incidents included severe
threats to her life or liberty, which are required to establish past
persecution.8 2 Moreover, the fact that Hadi's entire family,
including her young son, still lived in Indonesia, led the court to
73 No. 04-3343, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301 (3d Cir. Oct. 27, 2005).
74 453 F,3d 151 (3d Cir. 2006).
75 156 (3d Cir. 2006) (dismissing Hadi as "non-precedential").
76 Id. at *3 (describing Hadi's persecution).
77 Id. at *3-*4 (providing basis for Hadi's asylum, withholding of removal, and
Convention Against Torture claims).
78 Id. at *3-*4, *6 (reiterating some of Hadi's implausible statements, such as that no
Indonesian Catholic's attended her church, and mentioning that Hadi admitted lying at
her asylum interview).
79 Id. at *3-*6(explaining procedural context).
80 Id. at *4 (providing background as to how voluntary departure issue came before
court).
81 See id. at *5-*9 (analyzing Hadi's asylum claim).
82 Id. at *8 (explaining why facts in this case did not fall within scope of past
persecution); see Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2001) (defining persecution by
government as "more than generally harsh conditions shared by many other persons",
which includes "threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe
that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom.").
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:3
believe they could not be so discriminated against as to find Hadi
had a well-founded fear of future persecution.8 3 Next, the court
quickly denied Hadi's withholding of removal claim explaining,
"if a petitioner is unable to satisfy the standard for asylum, he
necessarily fails to meet the standard for withholding of
removal."84 Thirdly, Hadi was not entitled relief under CAT
because neither her testimony, nor her documentary evidence
provided any objective evidence that if she were to return to
Indonesia she would be tortured.8 5
Subsequently, the court addressed whether it had jurisdiction
to hear Hadi's motion to stay voluntary departure. 86 In finding it
could not stay voluntary departure, the court relied heavily on
Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft,87 a recent precedential decision in
which the court held that its power to reinstate voluntary
departure had been eradicated by IIRIRA.88 In that decision, the
Third Circuit explained IIRIRA lacked explicit language
permitting the circuit courts of appeals to exercise authority over
motions for stays of voluntary departure, and further, that it
vested exclusive authority to reinstate voluntary departure in the
Attorney General.8 9 Though unlike the petitioner in Reynoso-
83 See Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *9 (using Hadi's leaving her own son
behind in Indonesia as proof that she could not, or should not, have been that fearful of
persecution upon return to her country); see also Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 534 (3d
Cir. 2005) (holding that one factor in determining that petitioner lacked a "well-founded
fear of future persecution" was the fact that all of petitioner's and her husband's siblings
still lived in Indonesia and had been unharmed during period in question).
84 Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *10 (denying Hadi withholding of removal);
see Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating standard for
withholding removal is higher than asylum, so that if Petitioner is unable to establish
standard for asylum, he definitely cannot establish claim for withholding of removal).
85 Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *10-*11 (3d Cir. Oct. 27, 2005) (finding
there was insufficient evidence to entitle Hadi to relief under CAT); see, e.g., Berishaj v.
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 332 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining alien seeking relief under CAT
must prove that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured upon removal to a
certain country).
86 Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *12 (assessing its own authority to suspend
voluntary departure).
87 369 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2004).
88 See Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *13 (examining how court's holding in
Reynoso-Lopez that Third Circuit may not reinstate voluntary departure affects decision
in Hadi); see Federal Decisions In Brief, N.J. LAW., at 19 (reiterating court's holding that
it "lacked jurisdictional authority to reinstate the immigration judge's grant of voluntary
departure and extend the petitioner's departure date" in Reynoso-Lopez).
89 Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *13 (explaining Reynoso-Lopez's statutorily
based rationale); see Federal Decision, supra note 88, at 19 (commenting Third Circuit
found IIRIRA clearly granted authority to reinstate or extend voluntary departure to
Attorney General and his delegates).
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Lopez, Hadi filed her motion to stay prior to the expiration of her
voluntary departure period, the court found this difference
"legally insignificant," stating that just like reinstatement,
tolling would permit her additional time within which to
depart. 90 Lastly, the court noted that even with this holding,
asylum-seekers will not sacrifice their rights to petition for
review, as they maintain their rights after departure. 91
C. Debate: Which Side Ultimately Triumphs?
i. Circuit Courts of Appeals Have the Power to Suspend
Voluntary Departure:
As previously mentioned, proponents of staying voluntary
departure tend to argue that doing so falls within the courts'
discretionary equitable powers. 92 The most compelling reasons
for employing equity when dealing with voluntary departure are
threefold: fear of imminent persecution upon the alien's
departure from the United States; 93 concern that litigating from
90 Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *15, *17-*18) (concluding Reynoso-Lopez
holding applies equally to staying voluntary departure as it does to reinstatement); see
Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 277 (denying petitioner reinstatement of expired voluntary
departure date).
91 See Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *18 (addressing concern about losing
due process rights to full and fair review upon departure from the United States); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006) (declaring in pertinent part:
Judicial review of certain legal claims. Nothing.. . in any other provision of this Act
(other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for
review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.
Id.).
92 See Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 266-68 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that since
Hobbs Act permits courts to exercise discretion, and a petition for review cannot feasibly
be completed within even the maximum possible voluntary departure period, courts must
retain equitable power to stay voluntary departure); see also Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d
606, 615 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating "the grant or denial of a stay pending appeal is a
customary part of the judicial function.").
93 See Rife, 374 F.3d at 615 (describing courts fear that compelling petitioners to
voluntarily depart prior to final decision on merits of their asylum claim may cause them
to become vulnerable to persecution in interim); see also Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303,
310 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding a stay was necessary to ensure that petitioner's daughters
were not forcibly subjected to female genital mutilation).
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abroad is not feasible; 94 and that such relief is not statutorily
precluded, and may actually be authorized. 95
First and foremost, is the grave concern that compelling an
asylum-seeker to await review of her petition while abroad may
lead to dire consequences, that no court, however powerful, just,
and compassionate can ameliorate, for example, assassination. 96
Such was the Eighth Circuit's apprehension, in Rife v. Ashcroft.97
In that case, a religiously mixed Russian-Orthodox/Jewish
family's home had been shot at and damaged during religious
and ethnic strife in Azerbaijan. 98 Additionally, the father, a
cameraman, was jailed and beaten for filming an anti-Soviet
demonstration. 99 To escape persecution, the Rifes sought refuge
in Israel, but once their originally friendly neighbors discovered
the Rifes were Christian, they began not only insulting them, but
also demonstrating such cruelty and hatred as casting stones at
them. 100
With regard to voluntary departure, the court conceded that
IIRIRA eliminated the dilemma of choosing between judicial
review and voluntary departure, as it repealed the statute
prohibiting courts from reviewing petitions of aliens who had
departed from the United States.lOl In spite of this, the Eighth
Circuit still found inability to stay voluntary departure unjust in
situations where an asylum-seeker complying with his order of
94 See Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2004) (asserting
difficulty in appealing one's case from outside of United States); see also Young, supra
note 5 (describing practical difficulties in pursuing litigation from abroad).
95 See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 267 (1st Cir. 2005) (suggesting that had Congress meant to
rescind judiciary of authority to stay voluntary departure, it would have expressed its
intention less obscurely); see also Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1285-89 (9th Cir.
2005) (construing court's power to stay voluntary departure using various techniques).
96 See Walsh, supra note 5, at 2881 (worrying that by compelling voluntary departure
pending review an asylum-seeker might become vulnerable to further persecution); see
also Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 478-79 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the potentially
fatal vulnerability of the petitioner if forced to return to Romania on account of his
activism in the National Liberal Party).
97 374 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2004).
98 Id. at 608-09 (providing factual basis for claim).
99 Id. at 613 (explaining how the father believed that the perpetrators were members
of the "KGB").
100 Id. at 609 (detailing the cruel treatment the Rifes received because of their faith).
101 Id. at 615 (admitting lIRIRA allows for review from abroad); see 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(3)(B) (stating in pertinent part. '"With respect to review of an order of removal...
[s]ervice of the petition on the officer or employee does not stay the removal of an alien
pending the court's decision on the petition, unless the court orders otherwise.").
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voluntary departure "suffer[s] the very persecution being
litigated before the appeal has been completed."1 02 Accordingly,
pursuant to the holding that stays pending appeal may be
granted upon the alien making a proper showing, the Rife's
voluntary departure periods did not begin running until the court
issued its mandate. 103
Interestingly, as in Rife, many courts staying voluntary
departure do so fearing the asylum-seeker will be prevented from
ever re-entering the United States upon returning to her
homeland;04 voluntary departure does not compel the Petitioner
to return to her country of origin. 105 Instead, a person accepting
such relief may designate any country that will accept her as her
departure destination.106 Still, assuming a country other than
her own is willing to take the asylum-seeker in, it appears as if it
would be too difficult for an individual who has already faced and
fled persecution, and is thereafter forced to leave the United
States, a country representing her freedom and safety, to carry
out her appeal from yet another unfamiliar place.
While in Rife the Eighth Circuit declared that IIRIRA did away
with the complications associated with pursuing appeals upon
voluntarily departing,107 other circuits have not dismissed this
claim so hastily. 08 As explained in Bocova, it is impossible to
102 Rife, 374 F.3d at 615 (explaining problems remaining under IIRIRA, that courts
should be able prevent by staying voluntary departure).
103 Id. at 615 n.3 (defining factors for a "proper showing" and granting stay of
removal); see Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 270 (1st Cir. 2005) (utilizing same four-
part standard for determining whether to toll voluntary departure).
104 Rife, 374 F.3d at 615 (fearing asylum-seekers will face persecution when
voluntarily departing to their countries); see also Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 478-
79 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining the potential vulnerability of the petitioner being
persecuted by communist loyalists if forced to return to her homeland of Romania).
105 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(3)(A) (inferring permission to depart to a country other
than Petitioner's native land from the following: "travel document is not necessary to
return to his or her native country or to which country the alien is departing").
106 See Falaja v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating Falaja family
failed to designate a country of removal); see also Jama v. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 337-38 (2005) (explaining because Jama did not designate a
country to which he wanted to be removed, the immigration judge designated Somalia).
107 Rife, 374 F.3d at 615 (stating IIRIRA resolved prior injustice of either forfeiting
review or forfeiting opportunity to depart without consequence).
108 See, e.g., Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2004) (countering
argument that there is no longer a reason for staying voluntary departure); see also
Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the proposition
that "the equitable power of the courts of appeals extends to stays of voluntary
departure.").
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perform all the tasks necessary for review within the allotted
departure period. 109 Thus, if the circuit does not stay voluntary
departure, the asylum-seeker desiring to retain the benefits of
his voluntary departure period, will undoubtedly have to
continue his appeal from overseas. While this initially seems to
cause no conflict, the court in Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft1O
commented, "this analysis underestimates the difficulty that
aliens will likely encounter in pursuing appeals from afar."111
One practical roadblock in continuing one's petition for review
while outside American boarders is communicating with one's
lawyer, which is imperative to successful litigation.112 Another
realistic barrier to litigating from abroad is that since many
immigrants enter the United States due to economic hardship in
their home countries, they may not be financially capable of
returning to America upon a favorable decision. 113 Consequently,
the asylum-seeker might still be forced to forfeit review in order
to retain the benefits of voluntary departure.
Finally, advocates for staying voluntary departure have
asserted that granting this type of relief must still be within the
courts' jurisdiction, as IIRIRA did not expressly divest the
judiciary of this power.11 4 Correlated, is the notion, most
109 Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 269 (1st Cir. 2005) (asserting that inability to
complete review, even within a maximum period to depart, warrants use of equitable
powers in staying voluntary departure).
110 383 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing courts ability to issue stays under
IIRIRA).
111 Id. at 653 (proffering difficulties in litigating from abroad are sufficient to
necessitate court's use of discretionary power); see Young, supra note 5, at 19 (reiterating
Seventh Circuit's rationale in Lopez-Chavez).
112 See The Legal Serv. Corp., The Erlenborn Commission Report, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.
J. 99, 128 (2000) (discussing migrant Mexican farmers' difficulty obtaining H-2A contracts
because they cannot confer enough with their lawyers); Laura K. Abel & Risa E.
Kaufman, 21st Annual Edward V. Sparer Symposium Suing the Government: Velazquez
and Beyond: Preserving Aliens' and Migrant Workers' Access To Civil Legal Services:
Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491, 495 (2003) (noting
problems with migrant and alien workers' access to legal services).
113 See Yee, supra note 12, at 606 (asserting most immigrants enter the United States
hoping to obtain economic opportunities); see also Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399, 405
(6th Cir. 2005) (reviewing claim that as a Mohajir, Petitioner was subjected to economic
deprivation).
114 See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 267 ("[w]e do not find any language in the IIRIRA itself
that limits our authority to suspend the running of an unexpired voluntary departure
period."); Walsh, supra note 5, at 2883-84 (cataloging cases involving stays of departure
periods).
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comprehensively pronounced by the Azarte v. Ashcroft court,115
that statutory construction suggests IIRIRA provides for the
circuit courts of appeals' capacity to suspend time within which
to voluntarily depart.116 The court began its discussion by stating
pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,117 when reviewing an administrative agency's
statutory interpretation, the reviewing court must begin its
inquiry by considering whether the language of the statute is
ambiguous.118 Utilizing this method of review, the court then
examined provisions enabling aliens to file motions to reopen
their cases within ninety-days of their prior decision.11 9 The
court noted that the Attorney General is vested with the
unequivocal authority to grant aliens voluntary departure
periods of up to sixty-days.120 Nonetheless, how these provisions
could be reconciled still remained vague, thereby requiring the
court to proceed one step further in order to arrive at a viable
reading of the law.121
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit applied the rule that statutes
are interpreted as a whole, which encompasses the idea that no
115 394 F.3d 1278, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining the court's way of interrupting
statutes).
116 See id. (noting this approach is more consistent with the statute as a whole); see
also Walsh, supra note 5, at 2886 (noting the Ninth Circuit's rationale that IIRIRA does
not specify the issue of stays with voluntary departure).
117 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (discussing statutory interpretation).
118 See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1285 (exercising Chevron deference); see also Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43 (stating first step is to ascertain whether Congress has
spokenon the issue).
119 See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1285-86 (reading 8 U.S.C. Section 1229a(c)(6)(A) with 8
U.S.C. Section 1229a(c)(6)(C)(i) (note that the court cited 1229a(c)(6)(C)(i) however, the
correct provision is 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)), and 8 U.S.C. Section 1229c(a)(1) with 8 U.S.C.
Section 1229c(b)(2)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) (2005) (stating in pertinent part,
"[a]n alien may file one motion to reconsider..."); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2005)
(providing, "[t]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a
final administrative order of removal.").
120 See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1286 (highlighting United States Code sections
designating power to grant voluntary departure to Attorney General); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1229c(a)(1) (2005) (giving Attorney General authority to "permit an alien voluntarily to
depart..."); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) (2005) (limiting voluntary departure period to sixty-
days).
121 See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1286 (commenting that while interaction among IIRIRA's
provisions was questionable, "traditional canons of statutory construction provide
sufficient guidance to enable us to answer that question."); see generally Sidikhouya v.
Gonzales, 407 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Azarte court tried to give
effect to both the voluntary departure and motion to reopen statutes).
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provision ought to detract from the force of another.122 Therefore,
the court contended that in order to effectuate both provisions,
IIRIRA must be read to permit the tolling of voluntary departure
where aliens file timely motions to reopen prior to the expiration
of their departure periods.123 Moreover, in light of the principle
that statutory interpretation should avoid leading to absurd
results, 124 the Ninth Circuit concluded that because it would be
nonsensical for Congress to have intended appeals to filed, but
not heard, tolling voluntary departure pending review must be
authorized.125 Lastly, as the holding in Azarte facilitated aliens'
ability to redress previous adverse decisions, it comported with
the constructional canon that removal statutes must be
interpreted in the Petitioner's favor.126 Thus, tolling voluntary
departure withstands statutory interpretation.
ii. Circuit Courts of Appeals Lack Power to Suspend
Voluntary Departure:
Conversely, courts that oppose tolling voluntary departure at
the circuit court of appeals level tend to emphasize a single, yet
highly persuasive, argument against its implementation. The
reason for which anti-suspension circuits' main assertion is so
convincing, is because it implicates the plain language of the
text. The statute most focused on in this context is found in the
Code of Federal Regulations and is entitled "Voluntary
departure-authority of the Executive Office for Immigration
122 See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1287-88 (describing "Whole Act Rule"); see also United
States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining Whole Act Rule directs
statutes' subsections to be interpreted in context of entire enactment).
123 See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288 (asserting most rational interaction of relevant
statutory provisions); Sidikhouya, 407 F.3d at 952 (agreeing with the Azarte court).
124 See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288 (declaring "[a]nother traditional canon of statutory
construction that necessitates tolling the voluntary departure period is that we must
avoid interpretations that would produce absurd results."); see, e.g., United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (stating, "absurd results are to be avoided and internal
inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with.").
125 Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1289 (explaining it would be absurd for Congress while
allowing for motions to reopen to intend to preclude their availability by not allowing for
staying voluntary departure pending review).
126 Id. (applying construction in favor of aliens); see Bocova v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 257,
267 (1st Cir. 2005) (exclaiming statutory ambiguities should be construed in favor of
aliens); see also Wong v. U.S. INS, 373 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining must
consider facts in light most favorable to plaintiff to determine if facts show violation).
(Vol. 21:3
VOLUNTARYDEPARTURE POST-IIRIRA
Review." 127 Secondarily, courts have also argued that staying
voluntary departure contradicts the very policy Congress aimed
to advance by allowing aliens to depart on their own volition.128
A final reason for forbidding circuit courts from suspending
voluntary departure periods is the concern that aliens might file
claims just to prolong their time in the United States. 129
The most scrupulous summary of how this statute strips courts
of appeals of the power to stay voluntary departure, and the
reasons for which rivaling contentions fail, is found in Reynoso-
Lopez v. Ashcroft.130 While the Third Circuit was contemplating
solely whether voluntary departure may be reinstated in
Reynoso-Lopez, it intimated that its rationale would equally
apply to tolling.131 Subsequently, Reynoso-Lopez's rationale was
in fact, formally adopted as the reasoning against tolling in
Hadi.132
Reynoso-Lopez came before the Third Circuit when the
Guatemalan Petitioner appealed from the denial of his asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under CAT claims. 133
Demetrio Reynoso-Lopez claimed he had been confined by
guerillas when he was ten-years-old, and upon escape fled by
himself to Mexico, where he worked for six years, and ultimately,
at the age of sixteen, entered the United States illegally. 134
Although the BIA affirmed the IJ in denying each of Reynoso-
Lopez's claims, it granted him thirty days within which to leave
127 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26 (2005).
128 See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
public policy behind voluntary departure is to promote expeditious departure from the
United States); see also Walsh, supra note 5, at 2857-58 (noting how due to the circuit
split, many aliens decide whether or not to accept voluntary departure as relief based on
their geographic location).
129 See Zazueta-Carillo, 322 F.3d at 1174 (suggesting aliens avoiding return to their
countries might file frivolous petitions so that their voluntary departure would be stayed);
see also Walsh, supra note 5, at 2870 (discussing the circuit split with regard to stays
after appeal for aliens in voluntary departure cases).
130 369 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2004).
131 Id. at 277 (defining relevant issue).
132 Hadi v. Att'y Gen., No. 04-3343, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *13-*15 (3d Cir.
Oct. 27, 2005) (applying Reynoso-Lopez to staying voluntary departure because difference
between them is 'legally insignificant.").
133 Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 277 (providing procedural history); see Federal
Decisions, supra note 88, at 19 (explaining Reynoso-Lopez was before the third circuit
seeking review of BIA's decision).
134 Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 277 (explaining facts of Reynoso-Lopez's case).
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the United States voluntarily.135  However, Reynoso-Lopez
overstayed his voluntary departure period claiming that he
remained in the United States so as to appeal the BIA's
decision. 136 In the alternative to a reversal on his claims,
Reynoso-Lopez sought reinstatement of his voluntary departure
period.137
The court acknowledged that the authority to reinstate
voluntary departure pending review was an issue of first
impression in the Third Circuit. 138 The court began its inquiry by
strictly construing the voluntary departure statute, which states
that only specified officers, including the district director, can
extend voluntary departure.139  Consequently, the court
concluded that because Congress had not expressly granted
appellate courts jurisdiction to reinstate voluntary departure,
they lacked such power. 140
Furthermore, the Third Circuit noted Reynoso-Lopez's
remedies were not exhausted just because of the court's inability
to reinstate his voluntary departure.141 Under IIRIRA, aliens
desiring further relief request such relief from the district
director, who has been vested with sole authority to set, extend,
and stay voluntary departure.X42 Additionally, the court declared
Reynoso-Lopez would not be deprived of due process under this
statutory scheme, because even if an alien must voluntarily
depart prior to receiving a final judgment on his appeal, the court
135 Id. at 277-78 (stating IJ granted Petitioner voluntary departure).
136 Id. (offering reason why Reynoso-Lopez failed to comply with his order to
voluntarily depart).
137 Id. at 277 (defining basis for exploring circuit's jurisdiction to reinstate voluntary
departure).
138 Id. at 280 (beginning reinstatement discussion).
139 Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. Section 1240.26(f)); 8 C.F.R. 1240.26(f) (2005) (stating,
"authority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an
immigration judge or the Board is only within the jurisdiction of the district director, the
Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of
Juvenile Affairs .... ).
140 Id. at 277 (concluding on issue after strictly construing statute and hearing
Government's and Reynoso-Lopez's arguments).
141 Id. at 281 (explaining Reynoso-Lopez may be granted relief through application to
executive branch).
142 See Hadi v. Att'y Gen., No. 04-3343, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *17-*18 (3d.
Cir. Oct. 27, 2005) (applying Third Circuit's reasoning and holding to issue of staying
voluntary departure); see also Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 281 (construing IIRIRA strictly
to direct Petitioners seeking stays and reinstatements of their voluntary departure
periods to request such relief from their respective district directors).
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retains jurisdiction to review his claim.143 Being that the law was
amended to permit aliens to pursue appeals from abroad, the
Third Circuit announced that the aliens' dilemma had been
solved, as they no longer had to decide between complying with
voluntary departure, thus taking advantage of its benefits, and
going forth with their petitions.144
Also noteworthy, the Ninth Circuit in Zazueta-Carillo v.
Ashcroft,145 highlighted two potential problems associated with
allowing courts to stay voluntary departure. Primarily, the court
explained that the public policy underlying voluntary departure
is to encourage and effectuate aliens' expeditious departure from
the United States.146 Therefore, suspending voluntary departure,
which grants aliens more time on American soil, would nullify
voluntary departure's very purpose.147
Additionally, the Zazueta-Carrillo court expressed its concern
about the possibility that if courts could suspend voluntary
departure during the course of aliens' appeals, aliens seeking to
extend their penalty-free time in the United States would file
countless frivolous petitions for review. 148 However, as courts
have adopted inflexible standards that must be met prior to
stopping the clock on a particular individual's voluntary
departure, the Ninth Circuit worried unnecessarily.149 In fact,
143 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2005).
Requirements for review of orders of removal. With respect to review of an order of
removal under subsection (a)(1), the following requirements apply. Service. Stay of order.
Service of the petition on the officer or employee does not stay the removal of an alien
pending the court's decision on the petition, unless the court orders otherwise.
See also Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 281, which interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) to
provide for a court's ability to adjudicate an alien's appeal even after he/she has
voluntarily departed.
144 See id. at 281 (explaining 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c), which stripped appellate courts of
jurisdiction once petitioner departed from the United States, was eradicated by IIRIRA);
see also Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (declaring
IIRIRA overruled previous jurisdictional bar on carrying on petition once alien voluntarily
departed, and eliminated dilemma).
145 322 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2003).
146 See id. at 1173 (citing Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. INS, 546 F.2d 515, 521 (2d Cir.
1976)) ("The purpose of authorizing voluntary departure in lieu of deportation is to effect
the alien's prompt departure without further trouble to the Service.").
147 See id. at 1173-74 (using public policy to demonstrate absurdity of staying
voluntary departure).
148 See id. at 1174 (worrying aliens will file meritless claims with the circuit courts in
order to tack on a great deal of time to their life in America).
149 See, e.g., Bocova v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 257, 264-66 (1st Cir. 2005) (delineating
requirements for tolling voluntary departure); Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d. 703, 706 (7th Cir.
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the Ninth Circuit itself had previously applied such a
formulation for stays of removal Andreiu v. Ashcroft, which it
thereafter applied to stays of voluntary departure in El Himri v.
Ashcroft.150 Thus, it is highly dubious that the same court, when
adjudicating Zazueta-Carrillo, was actually troubled that aliens
might profit from their fraudulent claims. 151
III. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: A NEUTRAL DECISION MAKER, OR
AN OVERLY INTERESTED PARTY?
Admittedly, the Third Circuit's argument is cogent, as it
focuses on the clear text of the statutes. 152 Moreover, the Hadi
court emphasized strict construction in finding that it could no
longer stay voluntary departure.153 Hence, its interpretation of
IIRIRA seems to defeat the First Circuit's contention that if
Congress had intended to divest the judiciary of its authority to
stay voluntary departure it would have "expressed its intention
in a much more direct and pointed fashion."154 Furthermore,
Hadi's adoption of Reynoso-Lopez's textually exacting approach
equally seems to trump the rigmarole the Ninth Circuit in Azarte
went through to prove Congress intended circuit courts of
appeals to retain authority to stay voluntary departure. 155
However, while under the Reynoso-Lopez analysis, circuits
concluding they lack authority to stay voluntary departure may
1999) (laying out criteria implemented when reviewing motion to stay voluntary
departure).
150 344 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 2003).
151 See id. at 1262 (adopting standard for stays of removal for stays of voluntary
departure); see also Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 483 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating aliens
desiring to have their removal periods stayed must show "either (1) a probability of
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious legal
questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the Petitioner's favor.").
152 See Hadi v. Att'y Gen., No. 04-3343, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *16-*18 (3d
Cir. Oct. 27, 2005) (noting that the statutory language is clear); see also Reynoso-Lopez v.
Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2004) (highlighting that IIRIRA is specific in its
language and directives, enabling a strict construction of the statute).
153 See Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *17-*18 (stating Reynoso-Lopez made
clear statutes pertaining to voluntary departure vest authority to stay such relief
exclusively in Attorney General's delegates, such as district director).
154 Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 2005).
155 See Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *13-*14, *17-*18 (adopting Reynoso-
Lopez's plain meaning of text argument); see also Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1288
(9th Cir. 2005) (reading voluntary departure statutes according to various constructional
rules, such as "Whole Act" rule, to prove circuit courts still have power to suspend
voluntary departure pending review).
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have the plain meaning of the text on their side, this construction
effectuates a number of fundamental problems. The most
egregious of these is where the asylum-seeker, although having
complied with her order of voluntary departure and having been
granted asylum while abroad, is unable to return to America
because of her government's torturous tactics, or inability, or
unwillingness to protect her from her persecutors. Another
alarming consequence of employing rationale like that of the
Third Circuit is that it indirectly prevents appeals due to the
difficulties of pursuing litigation in United States courts while
residing in a foreign country.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that no such tragedies or
denials of due process have ever, or will ever occur, there is still
another compelling reason for permitting the courts to stay
voluntary departure. That is, the current law, on which strict
constructionist courts base their arguments, vest in the Attorney
General and his delegates the sole authority to suspend
voluntary departure.156  As is obvious from even the most
rudimentary reading of immigration cases, the Attorney General,
and the agencies under him, are interested parties to the
proceedings.157 Additionally, not only are the Attorney General
and his delegates interested parties, but they are the adverse
parties responsible for charging the aliens with removability, and
thereafter, presenting evidence against them at trial.158 Thus, it
156 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (2005) (stating, "[a]uthority to extend the time within
which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is
only within the jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate
Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Office of Juvenile
Affairs"); see also Hadi, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23301, at *17-*18 (affirming that Reynoso-
Lopez made clear statutes pertaining to voluntary departure vest authority to stay such
relief exclusively in district director).
157 See, e.g., Bocova, 412 F.3d at 265 n.1 (noting "[aln alien who has departed the
United States while under an outstanding order of removal is ineligible for readmission to
the United States for a period of either five or ten years, depending on the circumstances,
without the Attorney General's consent."); Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 651-53
(7th Cir. 2004) (citing numerous decisions involving voluntary departures which former
Attorney General John Ashcroft was a party to); Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275,
277 (3d Cir. 2004) (ruling that given Attorney General's exclusive power "to reinstate or
extend voluntary departure[s]" the court has no jurisdictional authority on that issue);
Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 704 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting Department of Justice, a
Government agency guided by Attorney General, as counsel for INS).
158 See Perez v. Bureau of Immigration, No. 04-CV-901F, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38151, at *3-*4 (W.D.N.Y. June 16, 2005) (noting 8 U.S.C.S. § 1252(g), which provides
that "no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
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is counterintuitive that at the appellate level they should be
empowered with exclusive authority to deliberate on whether to
toll an alien's voluntary departure, as they clearly have a conflict
of interest. 159 Since there ought to be a disinterested third party
presiding over an alien's request for voluntary departure, this
responsibility is best placed in the judiciary. Furthermore, prior
to IIRIRA's enactment, it was evident from the text of the United
States Code, that judges, equipped with the requisite neutrality,
are most appropriately situated to decide on motions to stay
voluntary departure. 160 Far from novel, this notion was generally
accepted among the courts. 161
Yet another reason for accepting that circuit courts of appeals
should hear requests to stay voluntarily departure is that many
of them have implemented reasonable criteria for adjudicating
such requests on an individual basis. 62  The creation of
standards demonstrates that judges are disposed to deliberating
on such claims, and will not do so indiscriminately.163 Thus,
proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter"); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)
(acknowledging Attorney General's power to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, and
execute removal orders).
159 Just as there are several sources doubting whether the state is capable of
transforming into a neutral party for the purpose of plea-bargaining against criminal
defendants, it is doubtful that the governmental officials and agencies charging
immigrants with removability and litigating against them can be unbiased when
deliberating on their request for suspended voluntary departure. See Carolyn B. Ramsey,
The Discretionary Power of 'Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1309, 1322 n.61 (2002). Additionally, similar to the belief that prosecutors' quasi-
judicial role during certain proceedings does not guarantee that these proceedings are
fair, there is severe uncertainty as to whether there is neutrality and fairness when the
Attorney General and his delegates decide whether or not to extend an alien's voluntary
departure period. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2128 (1998).
160 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1254(e)(1) (1995) (repealed 1996) (granting Attorney General
discretion, but not sole authority, to extend voluntary departure periods); Richard
Cameron Blake, Note, Nkacoang v. INS: A Complementary Theory for Denying
Reinstatement of Voluntary Departure, 1997 B.Y.U.L. REV. 169, 181 (1997) (noting
Attorney General's "discretionary authority to permit eligible aliens to depart
voluntarily").
161 See, e.g., Chan v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 161, 164 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating pre-IIRIRA
voluntary departure was automatically granted by statute and courts had power to stay
voluntary departure pending review); Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003)
(noting court grant of deportation stay pending judicial review).
162 See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 266 (providing analysis for when it might be appropriate
to stay voluntary departure); see also El Himri v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1261, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 2003) (adopting Abbassi test); Sofinet, 188 F.3d at 706 (delineating requirements for
suspending voluntary departure periods).
163 Various courts, including the First Circuit in Bocova v. Gonzales, and the Seventh
Circuit in Sofinet v. INS, have defined standards for judging whether to suspend the
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authority to suspend voluntary departure in the interim prior to
a court's final determination should be conferred upon the courts,
as that is the most effective way to prevent biased decisions.
Nonetheless, as noted at the beginning of this article, the
foremost criticism of and reason for frustration with present-day
immigration law stems from the great inconsistency in its
interpretation and application. 164  Consequently, because
divergent tests for when it is proper to stay voluntary departure
have already emerged,165 simply declaring that courts should be
vested with such authority, without specifying a standard by
which they may execute that power, would only br perpetuating
the law's arbitrariness.
IV. MOVING FORWARD: CRAFTING WORKABLE CRITERIA
One possibly viable standard, as mentioned earlier, was
proposed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in El
Himri.166 In that decision the court applied a test that had
traditionally been used to adjudicate stays of removal to stays of
voluntary departure.167 The court noted that to succeed on a
motion for a stay of voluntary departure a Petitioner must
establish either that: (1) his case had a probability of success on
the merits and a possibility of irreparable injury; or, (2) that he
was raising serious legal questions and the balance of hardships
tipped sharply in his favor. 1 68 Fortunately for Haifa Saleh El
running of a voluntary departure period. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54. The
Supreme Court announced in Baker v. Carr, that where there is a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating a case, the issue may be a non-
justiciable political question designated to a coordinate branch. Accordingly, it can be
inferred that where such standards have been developed, as with voluntary departure,
the judiciary is vested with authority over the matter. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
210-211 (1962).
164 See Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 478 (9th Cir. 2001) (expressing that 1996
amendments require court to reinterpret its authority to stay removal); see also Chen v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 110, 111 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining IIRIRA caused circuit split).
165 See cases cited supra note 162; Walsh, supra note 5, at 2873-74 (discussing
different fourth and ninth circuit approaches to voluntary departure).
166 El Himri, 344 F.3d at 1262 (applying standard applied inAbbassi v. INS).
167 Id. at 1262 (holding criteria for obtaining stay of removal shall also apply to stays
of voluntary departure).
168 Id. (listing requirements for stay of voluntary departure).
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Himri, the Ninth Circuit found that he had established the
second alternative of this test, and thus granted his motion. 169
At first glance, it appears as if this test would solve the
asylum-seeker's dilemma, as it is concerned with those aliens
who would suffer "irreparable injury" and whose "hardships" are
weighty enough to shift the balance in their favor.170 However, in
practice, this standard can lead to unpredictable decisions. With
respect to the first option, the "probability of success on the
merits," cannot be known prior to making a final determination
on the case, and so, would allow judges to decide on their
instincts about the case, rather than facts and evidence.171 Also,
the alternative, that the alien is "raising serious legal questions,"
allows for excessive subjectivity as to what qualifies as a "serious
legal question."172 Furthermore, the very fact that there are
alternatives creates two separate opportunities for an alien to
have her voluntary departure period tolled. Thus, the extent of
the El Himri test's malleability would lead to further
incongruous decisions.
By contrast, in Sofinet v. INS,173 the Seventh Circuit used an
analysis with four elements, all of which needed to be met prior
to suspending voluntary departure. 174 Similar to the origins of
the El Himri test, the Sofinet analysis was not invented by the
court hearing the case, but had been previously developed and
used for stays of removal and injunctions pending appeal.175
Fortunately for Sofinet, his discretionary stay of voluntary
departure was granted because he demonstrated: (1) that he was
169 Id. at 1263 (granting El Himri's motion to stay voluntary departure because he
raised serious legal questions).
170 Id. at 1262 (setting out criteria).
171 Id. at 1262 (providing first way in which a petitioner might prove his voluntary
departure period should be suspended); see Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.
1998) (stating courts "evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by
district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief").
172 El Himri, 344 F.3d at 1262 (identifying second reason alien voluntary departure
periods should be stayed); Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514 (stating that these evaluation
standards for preliminary injunctive relief were adopted from the district courts); see
Jeffrey R. Babbin et al., Developments in the Second Circuit: 2002-2003, 36 CONN. L. REV.
1187, 1276 n.686 (2004) (noting "serious legal questions" part of judicial inquiry).
173 188 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 1999).
174 Id. at 706 (listing criteria used by Sofinet court and other courts of appeals).
175 See id. (citing Rules 8 and 18 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Lucacela v. Reno, 161 F.3d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1998) as the sources of its four-part
analysis).
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likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm would
occur if his stay were not granted; (3) that the potential harm to
him would outweigh the harm to the opposing party if a stay
were not granted; and (4) that the granting of the stay would
serve the public interest. 176
Undoubtedly, this type of analysis is more concrete than the
two-option, overly flexible El Himri test, as there are four clear
requirements for granting a stay. 177 However, the Sofinet
standard, while apparently disallowing subjectivity, poses the
problem of being overly stringent. First, the requirement that
"irreparable harm would occur if a stay is not granted,"178 sets an
almost unreachable standard that the alien will definitely be
harmed if she returns to her country. Therefore, that
requirement precludes the period of voluntary departure from
being suspended for asylum-seekers who are likely but not
certain to suffer upon return to their homelands. Similarly, it
seems that a minimal number of immigrants would be able to
demonstrate that granting their stay would actually "serve the
public interest."179 Thus, under the Sofinet analysis, the asylum-
seeker's dilemma would persist for the vast majority of aliens
with legitimate claims.
Yet another criteria, as discussed in depth above, was recently
expounded in Bocova v. Gonzales.180 The four-part Bocova test is
almost identical to the Sofinet analysis. However, the Bocova
requirement that "the stay would not disserve the public
interest," seems to be a more attainable standard than "serving
the public interest," and thus, it is a significant improvement.181
However, the standard is still unduly restrictive because as in
Sofinet, the Bocova analysis requires the asylum-seeker to show
she "will suffer irreparable harm absent the stay."182
176 Id. at 706, 709 (noting that Sofinet's case was substantial based on the test).
177 Id. at 706 (citing Lucacela v. Reno, 161, F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1998)).
178 Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1999).
179 Id.
180 412 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 2005).
181 Compare id. at 270 (implementing a four-part analysis that only requires an alien
to show "that the stay would -not disserve the public interest") with Sofinet, 188 F.3d at
706 (providing that an alien must show that "the granting of the stay would serve the
public interest").
182 Compare Bocova, 412 F.3d at 270 (listing as an element of the four-part analysis
that the alien show "that she will suffer irreparable harm absent the stay") with Sofinet,
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While Bocova appears to be a more effective standard, like
Sofinet it would incorporate elements rather than alternatives in
order to adequately control which alien's periods of voluntary
departure are stayed. Yet, unlike the standards in the above
named cases, the ideal analysis would permit greater protection
of a wider array of asylum-seekers with genuine claims.
Preliminarily, as proposed by Bocova and Sofinet, there should be
a likelihood of success on the merits in order to ensure that all
aliens will not be able to extend their time in the United States
by simply filing frivolous petitions.18 3 Secondly, aliens moving
for suspension of voluntary departure should establish they are
more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm if the period in
which they have to voluntarily depart is not stayed. Unlike the
standard in Bocova and Sofinet, this language encompasses those
claims in which there is at least a fifty-one percent chance that
the immigrant would be harmed if he or she departs from
America.18 4 With this modification, less asylum-seekers would
be faced with the dilemma of having to either wait for decisions
on their appeals in countries where there are severe threats
against their lives and liberties, or forfeit the benefits given to
them through voluntary departure. Thirdly, the requirement put
forth in both Bocova and Sofinet that the potential harm to the
asylum-seeker outweighs such injury to the government, should
be implemented with some further clarification. 185 The problem
with the way this criterion is presently worded, is that "injury to
the government" is left completely unqualified. Since this
proposed analysis would require that the alien have already
established that she is more likely than not to suffer irreparable
harm if her motion is not granted, the governmental interest
weighed against the likelihood of such severe injury must be
188 F.3d at 706 (requiring that an alien demonstrate "that irreparable harm would occur
if a stay is not granted").
183 Compare Bocova, 412 F.3d at 270 (requiring a showing that the alien is "likely to
succeed on the merits of her underlying objection") with Sofinet, 188 F.3d at 706
(requesting a demonstration of "a likelihood of success on the merits" before allowing a
discretionary stay of deportation).
184 The tests of Bocova and Sofinet demand that the alien definitively show that she
will suffer irreparable harm absent the stay, instead of allowing for a showing of
likelihood. See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 270; Sofinet, 188 F.3d at 706.
185 Bocova and Sofinet share the requirement that the potential harm to the alien
must outweigh the harm to the government, rather than simply offset it. See Bocova, 412
F.3d at 270; Sofinet, 188 F.3d at 706.
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great. For example, the "injury" an alien causes by simply
remaining in the United States, without contributing to or
detracting anything from society, would not be outweighed the
grave perils she is likely to face if forced to voluntarily depart.
Suppose a notorious terrorist could have initially made out his
eligibility for voluntary departure, which includes a showing of
good moral character.1S 6 Although this notorious terrorist may
be able to prove he is truly despised in his own country and is
extremely likely to face grave danger once he leaves American
soil, the threat he poses to our government by remaining in our
country is so serious as to warrant his departure. Thus,
narrowing the meaning of "government interest," to include any
time an alien's presence is more likely than not to be detrimental
to our country in more than just a pecuniary fashion. Such an
interest would be strong enough to weigh against any potential
harm to an alien. Finally, as in Bocova, a determination that
staying a particular alien's voluntary departure will not disserve
the public interest keeps the American citizens' best interests in
mind, without disqualifying most seriously endangered aliens'
voluntary departure periods from being suspended.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the current lack of uniformity among circuits
regarding the suspension of voluntary departure, the Supreme
Court will inevitably have to make a final ruling about whether
such discretionary relief may be stayed, and under what
circumstances. When the Court is finally faced with this issue,
the Justices should consider the ramifications of prohibiting
circuit courts to grant this discretionary relief. In this regard,
the best result would be for the Supreme Court to hold that
circuit courts have authority to stay voluntary departure so as to
avoid the tragedy of ultimately finding an asylum-seeker has a
valid claim when it is too late. To prevent aliens from bringing
frivolous claims just to extend their stay in the United States,
however, the Court should set some restrictions upon the Circuit
Courts of Appeals' suspension ability, perhaps even, as explained
186 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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above, adopting some of the courts' self imposed limitations.
Finally, the Supreme Court Justices should render the pernicious
8 Code of Federal Regulations Section 1240.26(f), which
essentially delegates the Plaintiff with the sole authority to
decide the Defendant's voluntary departure, and thus fate,
partially, if not completely void.
